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Abstract 
This article aims to explore the complex issue of what „makes” a foreign fighter: the 
origins, the key characteristics, the factors that push one away from one’s home country 
and towards, in the case examined in this article, the Islamic State. Stripping away 
distorted narratives and political discourse, the article attempts to outline the core of the 
radicalisation process within the Belgian context based on an overview of available 
sources. To reach a baseline of understanding as to why Belgian foreign fighters are 
disproportionately represented among Islamic State combatants, the article delves into 
the history of Islam in Belgium. This is necessary to be able to trace the processes that 
led to the contemporary situation. The article subsequently offers a discussion of the 
elusive profile of aspiring jihadist recruits.  
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Introduction 
It is not in the scope of this work to lay out the academic debate on how to disentangle 
the ambiguous, ill-defined and complex concept of radicalisation. 
For the purpose of clarity let it be stated that „radical” is a relative term, positioned 
in relation to mainstream political ideologies. Radicalism is thus understood – in a succint 
definition I would offer here – as striving for a break with the current order for political, 
economic or religious motivations. Processes like radicalisation have led to political 
violence and terrorism in the past, and Belgians have volunteered for foreign wars before. 
                                                          
1 Michael Depuydt is an International Relations Expert. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in International 
Relations from Corvinus University and is currently a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security and 
Development at King`s College London. 
M. DEPUYDT  COJOURN 2:1 (2017) 
It is with these parametres in mind that one needs to study the historical 
background of the present foreign fighter mobilisation in Belgium for service on the side 
of the Islamic State. 
 
The historical background 
The wave of Europeans in foreign battlefields that started in the 1980s did attract an 
unknown number of Belgian volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, in the Bosnian and 
Algerian civil wars, and finally in Iraq. Clandestine cells in Belgium have facilitated the 
journey of volunteers to the Afghan-Pakistan border since the early 2000s. For example, 
the perpetrators of the assassination of Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud2 in 
Afghanistan on the eve of 9/11 originated from Belgium (Coolsaet, 2015).  
 However, Islamic radicalism specifically, in the form of ultra-conservative 
Salafism, has been spread by Saudi-Arabia for more than half a century. Even in Belgium, 
Saudi-Arabia sees it as its moral and political duty to spread this interpretation of Islam. 
Saudi diplomats have held sway over the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC) since the 1960s 
(Benyaich, 2015). This body was considered the „representative of Muslims in Belgium” 
and its direct influence was measurable throughout the ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s (Benyaich, 
2015). This ICC appointed hundreds of Wahhabi imams and teachers, and although 
control over this key role was stripped from Saudi emissaries in the late 1980s and given 
into the hands of Belgian Muslims, the effects are manifest up to the present.  
 For further reading on the historical background of radicalisation and foreign 
fighters in Belgium I recommend the work of Rik Coolsaet, both the edite volume „Jihadi 
Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge” (2011) and his standalone research papers 
such as „Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave: what drives Europeans to Syria, and to 
IS? Insights from the Belgian case” (2015). The Dutch General Intelligence and Security 
Service has published work on the changing profiles of Dutch and Belgian foreign fighters 
(2014), as have Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont (2016). For a broader picture of the 
composition of foreign fighters in Europe I recommend the work of Van Ginkel and 
Entenmann (2016). For  an introduction to the Belgian context that serves both political 
scientists, policymakers and those interested in counterterrorism Benyaich’s 
„#radicalisme #extremisme #terrorisme” (2015) proves very useful. This aricle will make 
frequent references to these works. 
                                                          
2 The commander of „Northern Alliance” (a.k.a. „United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan”) 
forces opposing the Taliban at the time. 
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The current wave of foreign fighters 
In the past decade, the Belgian jihadi scene was in a gridlock. A few networks were 
discovered and their members arrested – the local jihadist scene consisted only of these 
small, isolated, and largely invisible networks (General Intelligence and Security Service, 
2014). The known number of Belgian foreign fighters was consistently between no more 
than 10 to 15 people, the number of willing candidates for departure was low, and even 
amongst those with such aspirations the success rate was minimal. 
 However, shortly thereafter this impasse ended, and Syria became a new magnet 
for foreign fighters. Activist groups of aspiring jihadists rose to the forefront attracting a 
large amount of media attention. They heralded, as Benyaich describes (2015: 20), a „new 
phase:” 
„For the first time youngsters that were born and raised in Belgium publicly and 
shamelessly exalted the holy war, martyrdom and the ‘Islamisation of the West’. It 
was a small clique of reborn, converted or strictly religious Belgian Muslim young 
people – most of whom were second or third generation. Suddenly the number of 
people that openly raved about the jihad were a multitude of the number of actual 
jihadists.” 
The import of Saudi Salafism, the decades-long lack of supervision or monitoring 
of radical voices among the imams and teachers appointed in Muslim communities, and 
the media hype over terrorism trials in the 2000s: all these factors formed the „tinder,” 
and with the „spark” of the Syrian crisis the idea of jihadism (be it in a celebratory or 
actual participatory role) spread like wildfire amongst a new generation of youngsters. 
 A key and striking difference between this generation and its forerunners is the 
suddenness, speed and scale of their departure. The Dutch General Intelligence and 
Security Service (2014: 24) compares it to other contemporary mass social phenomena, 
where an online hype can trigger a rapid mobilisation with an eventual impact offline. It 
is aptly described as: 
„A swarm, highly decentralised with numerous individual and largely autonomous 
elements that collectively however maintain a cohesion and direction (…) in the 
absence of a strong hierarchy and leadership structure, the main driving force within 
the movement is horizontal influence by friends, relatives, neighbours and other like-
minded individuals in both the online and offline world.” 
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Major networks 
While the networks, or network-elements, do act autonomously, that is not to say that 
they are unconnected. In the mosques of Brussels and Antwerp, underground networks 
have formed around key figures with experience in the jihadi scene, entrapping eager or 
vulnerable recruits into a process of radicalisation. Two major uncovered networks were 
that of Sharia4Belgium and the one organised around Khalid Zerkani (Van Vlierden, 
2016). These are best described by juxtaposition.  
 Sharia4Belgium has always been considered the most significant (and definitely 
the most mediatised) factor in explaining the radicalisation of Belgian foreign fighters. 
The number of fighters linked to this group is estimated to be up to 80, out of a total of 
up to 589. The Zerkani network is, however, in a close second position, with at least 59 
recruits who departed to Syria and Iraq under their guidance (Van Vlierden, 2016). 
Despite three of these recruits playing a direct role in Europe's latest terrorist attacks 
(Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Chakib Akrouh were perpetrators of the Paris attacks, while 
Najim Laachraoui made bombs and participated in the attack at Brussels airport), this 
network was still largely unknown as late as in 2015. 
 This is perhaps the most striking difference between the two networks, the well-
known Sharia4Belgium with its public demonstrations and its leader Fouad Belkacem 
regularly participating in debates and receiving media attention for his condemnation of 
what he calls „kafir” Belgian politicians. The most renowned recruit of the group is 
perhaps Jejoen Bontinck, whose story was widely discussed in the media.3 
The mostly Dutch-speaking organisation is an off-shoot of the Islam4UK 
movement, and had no ties to other radical networks or the older Belgian jihadi scene. 
For a long time it was considered an outspoken yet relatively harmless group that relied 
on rhetoric rather than violence, yet it still managed to recruit, radicalise and transfer a 
substantial number of would-be foreign fighters. 
 By contrast, there is the Zerkani network, an opaque French-speaking 
underground gang based in Brussels. Khalid Zerkani, a 42-year-old Moroccan based in 
Molenbeek, found potential recruits under the guise of community sports activities (Van 
Vlierden, 2016). His network has no specific name, no logo and no website, nor does he 
                                                          
3 Jejoen Bontinck is a Muslim convert who was recruited into Sharia4Belgium and departed for Syria at the 
age of 18. He returned disillusioned after 8 months and was given a suspended sentence. His former 
appearance on a TV talent show and his father’s sensationalist yet unsuccessful quest to track him down in 
Syria led to wide coverage of this story. 
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hold public demonstrations. Members committed petty theft to fund their future travels 
and radicalised behind closed doors. When it finally came to light, the network proved to 
be the most dangerous jihadist organisation in Belgium. While these organisations were 
not entirely separated, there is evidence of harder elements of Sharia4Belgium slowly 
merging with the group into a tangled web or conglomerate. 
 
Categories of foreign fighters  
It is hard to list general characteristics of foreign fighters but most are male, between 18 
and 35 years old, with an average age of 25.7 years, although 15-20 year-olds are far from 
being exceptions (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2015). In fact, this younger group is more 
substantial than in the previous generation of foreign fighters, and is overrepresented in 
certain categories of foreign fighters. They often have Moroccan roots and are second or 
third generation immigrants. The vast majority of them come from urban areas, 
specifically within the Flemish or Brussels regions, rather than Wallonia (Van Ginkel & 
Entenmann, 2016). There is no single profile of a European foreign fighter. In the case of 
Western Europe, beyond prison populations and badly integrated migrant youths, it is 
difficult to identify specific vulnerable individuals and groups (Schmid, 2013). 
 The causes that have led to their engagement are diverse, however they all eagerly 
use the Salafist framework and vocabulary to legitimise their behaviour because of its 
simplicity and absolutism. There are a multitude of subdivisions and categories by various 
scholars which cannot be outlined here so let me strongly advocate the work of Benyaich 
for a useful categorisation. It reflects the characteristics and behavioural patterns of 
modern foreign fighters and openly acknowledges that these categories are elastic. This 
„jihad elasticity,” as Benyaich (2015) calls it, is twofold: on the one hand it refers to the 
fuzzy lines between categories such as the „loser,” the „herd animal” and the „romantic” 
as they all involve impressionable young men seeking meaning and approval. At the same 
time, hardcore jihadis may have an opportunistic or glory-seeking motivation that is 
essential to the categories of „opportunist” and the „romantic.” On the other hand, 
Benyaich’s concept also refers to how each category responds differently, i.e. more or 
less, to deradicalisation programmes. Although the point made here is clear and widely 
recognized, it is still not reflected enough in policy measures: just as there is no single 
cause, there is no single profile and there is no single deradicalisation solution.  
In terms of the aforementioned jihad elasticity, certain profiles are very elastic 
(Benyaich, 2015). They respond strongly to preventive and repressive measures. In this 
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part of the spectrum early detection, guidance and reprimands/punishment can truly make 
a difference. Foreign fighters who correlate more with the hardcore jihadi type have been 
socialised in the Salafist framework from an early age and have internalised its teachings 
to such a degree that deradicalisation would be at the very least much harder and in all 
probability impossible. 
 
Jihadi brides: The peculiar role of women 
So far this article has not covered the role of women among European youth joining the 
Islamic State. Despite being overlooked in much of the academic literature, an average of 
17% of EU foreign fighters are female and the number of converts within that group range 
from 6 to 23% (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016). Perhaps exactly because of the 
influence of Western society, their role has increased compared to previous generations, 
and women are being used especially more and more as recruiting agents. 
Vranckx (2015: 149-150) offers a well-documented case of how such recruitment 
works: In 2012, a 21 year-old Dutch girl, Rosliana Geerman marries an Algerian man and 
converts to Islam. She starts liking ISIS-related posts on Facebook and gradually engages 
in contact with Belgian foreign fighters living in Syria. She also starts reaching out to 
other young Muslim girls interested in the events in Syria. Messages get passed along, 
describing how great it is to be there, how everyone has access to all they need, including 
pools and mansions, and that one can do whatever one wants. Eventually she convinces 
two girls from Antwerp to attempt to leave for Syria. 17 year-old Jessy and 18 year-old 
Hakima are intercepted just in time. (The girls were placed into juvenile detention and a 
governmental institution for youth protection. Geerman was arrested.) 
 This is reminiscent of the pictures of the two Austrian girls, Samra (16) and Sabina 
(15), on social media – veiled, yet armed with Kalashnikovs. They had left their homes 
in Vienna in 2014, leaving a note for the parents that read: „Do not look for us. We will 
serve Allah and we will die for him” (Dearden, 2015). Poster girls of the Islamic State, 
the Salafist equivalent of the „We Can Do It” WWII propaganda in the United States. By 
now it is believed that one has been killed in combat while the other was caught several 
times trying to flee from the Islamic State, following her friend’s death, upon which she 
was raped repeatedly. She was subsequently offered as a sexual present to newly arriving 
fighters until she was finally beaten to death with a hammer (Dearden, 2015). 
 There are effective on-and offline channels specifically designed to recruit girls. 
A systematic procedure whereby they identify a harvest of potential female candidates 
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within a social group and then target a few directly. The notion of „Islamic Sisterhood” 
is used here by recruiters advocating travelling with a friend to the caliphate. That way, 
girls peer-pressure each other into leaving and they are less likely to change their minds 
mid-journey. It is also noteworthy that the average age is lower than that of the men, 
sometimes even 13 to 15 year-olds are involved, and they are very susceptible to the IS 
propaganda at this age (Vranckx, 2015). 
 It is unrealistic for females to actively join in the fighting. The role of women 
within the caliphate is inherently secondary – and sedentary. After marriage, which can 
take place at an age as young as nine, the woman’s place is in the household where she 
„remains hidden and veiled and maintains society from behind” (Quilliam Foundation, 
2015: 7). There are exceptions to this rule, yet they are few and strictly regulated (ibidem, 
pp. 7-8): 
„In a jihadist perversion of feminism, then, the importance of women is championed. 
She is deemed to play a central role in the inner workings of the so-called Caliphate. 
However, this is only insomuch as the jihadist ideology permits her. She may be 
important, but she faces myriad restrictions and an imposed piety that is punishable 
by hudud punishments. One important caveat made to the above is that it is 
sometimes permissible for a woman to leave the house. The circumstances in which 
this is permitted are: 
a) if she is going to study theology;  
b) if she is a women’s doctor or teacher;  
c) if it has been ruled by fatwa that she must fight, engage in jihad because the 
situation of the ummah has become desperate, “as the women of Iraq and Chechnya 
did, with great sadness”.’  
The Islamic State has shown itself more than willing to supply travel documents and 
financial means for the marital journey of female recruits, with varying success. Those 
inolved are mostly pubescent girls who are exposed via social media to these „rebels with 
a cause:” rugged and tough bandits that are vastly different from the clean-cut, 
unattainable and overly marketed boy bands that their native peers adorn. Getting married 
and birthing jihadists is a set of tasks in stark contrast with the contemporary Western 
female gender ideal and ideals of gender equality (Vranckx, 2015). 
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The radicalisation process: Key factors 
Radicalisation has become the key term in understanding European foreign fighters, 
regardless of its previously discussed troubled connotations. It is a process that starts with 
estrangement and is amplified by indoctrination, and has a plethora of diverse causes and 
risk factors. 
These risk factors at play are, however, quite similar in all models, and they can 
be loosely grouped along religious/cultural, political, socio-economic and psychosocial 
lines. These categories are echoed in the work of various academics, with minor 
variations. It must be stated in advance that it remains one of the crucial gaps in 
radicalisation research to understand why there are many individuals exposed to these 
enabling background characteristics who however do not (or do not as fully) radicalise 
(Schmid, 2013). 
 
Religious/cultural factors 
Much more important and much more dangerous than mere membership of a certain 
religion are the sectarian and militant demonstrations, the attached mindset of superiority, 
and shrewd recruitment tactics (Benyaich, 2015). The described cases regarding the 
recruitment of girls display the level of sophistication of tactics aiming at enhancing 
radicalisation in receptive individuals. 
Social media presence, for example, is often underlined in public discourse and 
the media coverage of IS recruitment tactics, but in fact they use both online and offline 
means of approach. The tactics concerned go beyond merely putting out an extensive 
stream of videos, tweets and photos for their audience to share. They are targeted and 
diverse, made to cater to each separate target audience. 
For instance, prospective Western female recruits are convinced by the notion of 
Islamic sisterhood and fighting poster girls rather than by Arabic manifestos on the 
sedentary nature of women. The latter do not reach them as effectively, or may even be 
counterproductive. In the Quilliam Foundation’s analysis:  
„IS propaganda is always carefully honed to a particular target audience. For 
example, all the videos and photo reports that make it into Western media are 
intended to find a home there – the atrocities they depict are, first and foremost, 
designed to provoke outrage in the international community, a tactic that is part and 
parcel of the IS polarization strategy. In the same vein, this manifesto will not have 
been translated because it will have been deemed ineffective – perhaps even 
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counterintuitive – in achieving its propagandistic aims with a Western audience. 
Certainly, it plays on strikingly different themes to the messaging that comes from 
the chief recruiters of Western women to IS, its English-speaking muhaajirat 
population.” (Quilliam Foundation, 2015: 6) 
 
Political factors 
Radicals and extremists often participate in what is known as „system-blaming” 
(Benyaich, 2015). In their eyes, there is a „system” that treats them unjustly or even 
oppressively. On a national and local level, frustration because of a lack of inclusive and 
total citizenship, diminishing trust in local authorities, negative experiences with the 
judicial/educational/political system can all help shape these grievances. 
At times, such grievances are not imaginary. E.g. in February 2015, the Antwerp 
judicial office declared that prominent right wing politician Filip Dewinter would not be 
prosecuted for his online video game that involved the targeting of giant Mosques and 
Muslims on flying carpets because the procedural costs would not be worth it (Arnoudt, 
2015). Yet in the same month a trial against the radical organisation Sharia4Belgium was 
held, even as only 7 of the 46 defendants appeared because the rest were fighting in Syria 
or have already been killed (Thillo, 2015). 
 In fact, trials are continuously being held, and sentences are handed out for foreign 
fighters and terrorists who are missing or dead. The trial against the Zerkani network 
featured only 13 of the 32 accused, as the rest were also in Syria or deceased. Not to say 
that these trials do not hold symbolic value, but no one has ever dared to question their 
usefulness over financial considerations. In the fight against extremism, double standards 
delegitimise the rule of law and polarise segments of the population. Maintaining a strong 
sense of legitimacy among the public regarding the fairness of the judicial and political 
system is paramount (Schmid, 2013). 
Similarly, when the Minister of the Interior Jan Jambon tweeted that a „significant 
portion of the Muslim community was dancing and celebrating after the Brussels 
bombings” (quoted in Knack, 2016), it is hard to argue against this idea of polarisation 
and perceptions of a lack of full citizenship for Muslims living in Belgium. Both 
government and the media should be more aware of the importance of verbal-rhetorical 
signals. 
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Socio-economic factors 
Another form of system-blaming also occurs: growing up in impoverished areas, unfair 
treatment in the job market, in social life, or in the housing market, the lack of social 
mobility are also often cited as grievances. While it is important to note that mere socio-
economic conditions have never been a direct pathway to extremism and terrorism, the 
sense of inequity that stems from them may feed powerfully into a feeling of alienation 
and increasing frustration.  
 The word „ghetto” frequently pops up in describing infamous Belgian 
neighbourhoods as well, such as Schaerbeek and Molenbeek. This structural inequality in 
urban development and its socio-economic consequences feed said frustration strongly in 
Belgium, as Jozef De Witte, former director of the Belgian Equal Opportunity Centre 
describes:  
„In Belgium, the gap between natives and immigrants from outside the EU in terms 
of employment and education is higher than anywhere else in Europe (…) How many 
people realise that half of our Moroccan community lives in poverty- compared to 
15% of the Belgians without migration background. Yet one cannot detect any sense 
of urgency among our decision-makers.” (Quoted in Rabaey, 2014.) 
 Data clearly shows that Muslims more frequently feel the impact of social 
deprivation than non-Muslims (Kustermans, 2015). The fact that some of the Syrian 
combatants are from wealthier families does not exclude social-economic deprivation as 
a risk factor for radicalisation.  
 
Psycho-social factors 
Identity crises, lack of recognition, juvenile delinquency: all these phenomena can lead 
to a search for purpose, somewhere to belong. Pessimism and hopelessness as the zeitgeist 
for youngsters may not have a direct effect but can play a role in the decision to become 
a foreign fighter. And while these may loom over other European countries too, Belgium 
seems particularly affected. The youth suicide rate in Belgium for 15-24 year olds (a 
crucial age range for radicalisation) is much higher, and has declined less than in most 
other EU member states (Coolsaet, 2015). Polls have found Belgium to be the second 
most pessimistic country in Europe (Gallup, 2014).   
 There is no single cause but rather a multitude of risk factors. But the starting point 
is always a feeling of estrangement, a search for identity. Belgium’s complex structure 
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and governmental divides further enhance this search, as there is hardly a basis of national 
identity to fall back on. Perhaps more so than in most other EU countries, the question of 
what it means to be Belgian is ambiguous and unclear, and radicalising young people 
more readily take to other aspects of their identity, e.g. their faith. 
 
Conclusion 
By giving a brief outline of the radicalisation process in the Belgian context in this article, 
I strived primarily to make the complexity of the issue apparent. There is a multitude of 
the types of foreign fighters and the lines between these categories are blurred. But the 
contributing elements form a matrix of risk factors, a set of recurring characteristics that 
are present to a varying degree in almost every individual fighter. 
Whilst there are notable differences in generations of foreign fighters, the lack of 
a sense of urgency among Belgian policymakers involved in prevention and 
deradicalisation has remained constant. Deradicalisation is hard, and it requires a nuanced 
and individually focused approach. Like prevention, its results do not lend themselves 
easily for the purposes of political grandstanding. 
Yet the focus needs to shift from repression to prevention. Rather than implement 
discriminatory punitive measures, the Belgian government should establish a framework 
for Islamic theology education and assert a tighter relationship with mosques within the 
country. It is only when there are imams who speak French or Dutch, who are key figures 
and have a feeling for the fabric of Belgian society, that the underground networks of 
unrecognised mosques can be halted. An extensive deradicalisation program is 
paramount, as well as bringing education on radicalisation to prisons, schools and youth 
care. A mere repressive attitude will push both would-be jihadists and returning fighters 
away from governmental oversight and into the shadows. Foreign fighters are a societal 
shortcoming, and we cannot condemn them without addressing the environment that 
shapes them. 
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